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We analyze how relative wage movements across birth cohortsand education groups
during the 1980s affected the distribution of householdconsumption. The analysis integrates the
labor economics literature on time variation in the wage structurewith the consumption insurance
literature. In contrast to previous tests of consumption insurance, weexamine the impact of
systematic. publicly observable shifts in the hourly wage structure.To circumvent the extreme
scarcity of longitudinal data with high quality information onboth consumption and labor market
outcomes, we draw upon the best available cross-sectionaldata sources to construct synthetic
panel data on consumption, labor supply and wages.
We find that low-frequency movements in the cohort-education structure of pre-tax hourly
wages drove large changes in the distributionof household consumption. The results constitute
a spectacular failure of the consumption insurance hypothesis,and one that is not explained by
existing theories of informationally constrained optimal consumptionallocations. We also
develop a procedure for assessing the welfare consequences of deviationsfrom full consumption
insurance and, in particular, from the failure to insulate the consumption distributionfrom relative
wage shifts across cohort-education groups.For a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to
two, fully insulating households from group-specific endowmentvariation would raise welfare
by an amount equivaltnt to a uniform 2.7% consumptionincrease.
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I. Introduction
The U.S. economy underwent pronounced, persistent movements in the structure of
relative wages during the 1980s. This paper analyzes how relative hourly wage movements
across birth cohorts and education groups affected the distribution of household consump-
tion and economic welfare. The analysis partially integrates two distinct literatures and
contributes to each.
One literature, large and very active, examines time variation in the structure of
relative wages. Coldin and Margo (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) provide two of the
more comprehensive investigations of relative wage movements in the United States during
recent decades. The main research thrust in this literature seeks to describe and explain
time variation in the wage structure, but much of the motivation clearly derives from the
perceived welfare consequences of changes in relative wages and overall earnings inequality.
The prevailing belief, annunciated by Card (1991), seems to be that measured changes in
the structure of income and labor earnings closely parallel changes in the distribution of
household welfare. Few papers in this literature even question this belief, much less subject
it to any serious evaluation —Cutlerand Katz (1991) is a notable exception. 2
Insharp contrast, research on risk sharing in consumption stresses the variety of ex-
plicit and implicit insurance mechanisms that insulate the distribution of consumption
from shocks to the distribution of earnings capacity and income. The empirical branch
of this second literature investigates whether observed consumption outcomes conform to
the implications of risk-sharing models —e.g.,Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Townsend
(1994)andAltonji et al. (1992). This literature exploits a simple and rigorous theory of
consumption allocations that delivers, under plausible restrictions on preferences, strong
Levy and Murnane (1992) provide an extensive survey of research on recent U.S. wage
structure developments, and Davis (1992) examines patterns of relative wage movements
across several countries.
2Somesociologists (Mayer and Jenks, 1991) also question whether U.S. wage and in-
come statistics accurately portray changes in the level and distribution of economic well-
being.
1implications for the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth. While this litera-
ture focuses on hypotheses that many economists view as implausible a priori, the empirical
specifications that emanate from the theory can serve more broadly as tools for investi-
gating and interpreting the extent, pattern, and nature of departures from full insurance
consumption outcomes.
--Previousempirical research in the consumption insurance literature typically relates
variation in idiosyncratic aspects of individual earnings capacity and income to individual
or household consumption behavior. In contrast, we examine the impact of systematic,
publicly observable shifts in the hourly wage structure on the distribution of household
consumption. A focus on this type of wage structure variation offers four advantages.
First, systematic relative wage movements across large groups of workers are uncorre-
lated with idiosyncratic components of individual-level preference shifts (e.g., changes in
health status or household composition). Since these preference shifts plausibly affect both
individual earnings capacity andhouseholdmarginal utility, they potentially induce false
rejections of consumption insurance hypotheses. Cochrane's (1991) analysis is especially
clear on this point.
Second, a focus on publicly observable relative wage movements means that our evi-
dence against consumption insurance cannot be rationalized by theories that stress the role
of unobserved shocks in an informationally constrained optimal consumption allocation —
e.g.,Green (1987), Townsend (1988), Phelan and Townsend (1991), and Atkeson and Lu-
cas (1992). These theories offer no explanation for why relative consumption growth rates
depend on publicly observed shocks under an optimal allocation. Rather, they suggest
perfect insurance against all publicly observed shocks. We return to this point in the con-
clusion, where we suggest how these theories can be modified to deliver informationaily
constrained optimal consumption allocations more consistent with our empirical findings.
Third, a focus on relative movements across observationally distinct groups of individ-
uals and households facilitates the use of cross-sectional data sets that offer comprehensive,
high quality information on either consumption or earnings, but not both. In particular,
we show how to implement tests of the sort advocated by Cochrane (1991) using synthetic
panel data rather than longitudinal data on individuals. Given the extreme scarcity of ion-
2gitudinal data sources with high quality information onboth earnings and consumption,
our ability to draw on cross-sectional data sets is anattractive feature of our empirical
strategy.
Fourth, the focus on relative wage movements across groups of households enables us
to devise suitable tests of consumption insurance in the face of nonseparable preferences
between consumption and leisure andimperfecttransferability of leisure across house-
holds. Given nonseparable preferences, previous consumption insurance tests rest upon
the maintained assumption that the social planner can freely transfer leisure across house-
holds (Cochrane, 1991 and Townsend, 1994). We explain why this maintained assumption
is unattractive and how its violation leads to false rejections of the consumption insurance
hypothesis. We circumvent the need to maintain this problematic assumption by exam-
ining the response of relative household consumption to relative wage movements among
groups of men with inelastic labor supply,while controlling for female labor supply. A
similar strategy would be difficult to implement in work that focuses on idiosyncratic com-
ponents of individual earnings capacity because of censored wageobservations for jobless
persons-
Section II develops our basic approach to anaiyzing the nexus between systematic
relative wage movements and the distribution of consumption. We review the theoryof
consumption insurance, and we use the theory to derive estimating equationssuitable
for synthetic panel data. Section III treats several specification issues that pertain to
life-cycle and demographic factors and preference nonseparabilities. All of our empirical
specifications relate time variation in the structure of wages among observationallydistinct
groups of workers to the distribution of consumption amonghouseholds headed by these
workers.
Section IV takes up econometric issues related to the error structure implied bythe
theory1 the error structure induced by misineasurenient and sampling variation,and the
choice between level and difference specifications. We discuss potential pitfallsof least
squares estimation on the synthetic panel data,and we develop an instrumental variables
strategy designed to overcome these pitfalls.
Section V describes the data and the construction of the synthetic panels.Our syn-
3thetic panels contain annual observations from 1980 to 1990 on five-year birth cohorts
crossed by four educational attainment categories. We calculate birth-education group
means for household consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX),
and we calculate group means for individual wage and labor supply data from the March
Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CEX and CPS
represent the best large-scale, cross-sectional data sets on consumption and labor market
outcomes, respectively, for the U.S. economy.
Section VI presents a descriptive analysis of relative wage and consumption move-
ments during the 1980s. Focussing on households with an adult male, we describe rel-
ative consumption movements across cohort-education groups. We also describe relative
wage movements among men and their wives. In line with previous work, we document
pronounced relative wage movements across education groups and birth cohorts. Further-
more, measured wages show large absolute declines among several cohorts of less-educated
workers. These sharp relative wage movements across observationafly distinct groups of
workers provide considerable leverage for estimating the impact of wage changes on the
consumption distribution.
Section VI also offers a pictorial analysis of the nexus between relative wage and
consumption movements across birth-education groups. Simple scatterplots reveal a spec-
tacular failure of the consumption insurance hypothesis to account for relativewage and
consumption comovements at low frequencies. The scatterplots also reveal that the re-
jection of the consumption insurance hypothesis arises in connection with relative wage
movements across education groups and relative wage movements across birth cohorts
within education groups.
Section VII carries out formal tests of the consumption insurance hypothesis and char-
acterizes the impact of systematic relative wage movements on the consumption distribu-
tion. The results provide strikingly sharp rejections of the consumption insurance hypoth-
esis. Specifications that emphasize low-frequency comovements provide greater support
for an extreme alternative to the consumption insurance hypothesis: relative consumption
growth rates equal relative wage growth rates. For the decade as a whole, the results also
indicate that changes in men's pre-tax relativewage rates were the dominant driving force
4behind the (large) changesin the distribution ofhousehold consumption. Higher frequency
comovements between relative wages and consumption show much weaker evidence against
the consumption insurance hypothesis and strong evidence against the extreme alternative
of no consumption smoothing.
Our finding that low-frequency relative wage movements influence the distribution of
household consumption may be unsurprising to many readers, but we view the magnitude
of the departure from the consumption insurance null as remarkable. There are many
mechanisms that potentially help insulate the household consumption distribution from
persistent shocks to the structure of pre-tax hourly wages among men: offsetting labor
supply responses by men, offsetting movements in relative wages or labor supply by their
wives and other household members, the progressivity of the income tax, changes in the
tax structure such as the 1986 increase in the earned income tax credit, public welfare
programs such as food stamps, altruistically motivated intra- or inter-generational transfers
that cut across birth cohorts or education groups, and consumption smoothing through
own holdings of real and financial assets. At least for the U.S. experience during the 1980s,
these smoothing mechanisms poorly insulated the distribution of household consumption
from shifts in the structure of pre-tax hourly wages among cohort-education groups of
men.
To assess the welfare consequences of these shifts in the household consumption cbs-
tribution, section Viii develops a procedure for quantifying the extent of departure from
an optimal consumption allocation. For plausible degrees of risk aversion, our calculi-
tions reveal that large consumption variations are required to compensate households for
the observed shifts in the consumption distribution across cohort-education groups. For
example, with a relative risk aversion of two, compensating households for the type of cross-
group consumption risk they faced during the 1980s requires a uniform 2.7% consumption
increase in all states and dates.
II. Theory and Empirical Specifications
A. Testable Implications of the Consumption Insurance Hypothesis
5Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968) derive the risk-sharing properties of Pareto-
optimal consumption allocations in full information environments. Scheinkman (1984)
was apparently the first to emphasize the einpixical implications of optimal risk-sharing
behavior for the distribution of consumption growth. Like Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991)
and Townsend (1994), we use the theory of optimal risk sharing to formulate testable
hypotheses and guide our empirical analysis of relative consumption movements.
A full insurance Pareto-optimal consumption allocation maximizes the discounted
weighted sum of individual households' utility functions:
Ci(St)> .\JE&i)t(5U[CJ(St)5J(5t)] (1)
j=1t=I Ss
where C'(St) is consumption by household jattime t when the state of the world is 5á;
\i is household j's Pareto weight, which reflects the initial distribution ofwealth; (pfl'
is household j's discount factor at time t; ir(St) denotes the probability of state 5t; and
and ö3(St) indexes arbitrary cross-sectional and time variation in householdpreferences.
Feasibility requires that aggregate consumption be less than or equal to the aggregate
endowment (or aggregate production) at each date and in each state of the world.
The first-order conditions for Pareto-optimal consumption allocationsare
(pi)t\iu [Ci(St), 8J(st)j = p(st)for all 5' andj = 1,..., (2)
where p(S') equals the Lagrange multiplier associated with thefeasibility constraint, di-
vided bythe probability of state St. The set of first-order conditions given by(2) embody
the implications of full insurance for consumptionpatterns across individuals, time periods
and states of nature. In more concise notation, we write these first-orderconditions as
(p)00'c(C,,5,') = Pt. (2)
Full insurance implies identical growth rates across households in themarginal utility
of consumption. To see this point, first note that themultiplier p in (2) varies with aggre-
gate consumption but is constant across households for a particular state and date.Hence,
6given aggregate consumption and the Pareto weights, individual households' consumption
allocations do not vary with their endowments. Second, since the Pareto weights are time
invariant, we can use observations at two points in time to remove the household fixed
effects:





Equation (3) says that the growth between t and i + 1 in the discounted marginal utility
of consumption is the same for all households.
Thus, under the theory, measured consumption growth can vary across households for
only three reasons: (i) utility functions differ across households;3 (ii) households experience
idiosyncratic preference shocks; and (iii) observed household consumption growth contains
idiosyncratic measurement error components. In particular, any variable that is cross-
sectionally uncorrelated with preference variation and measurement error in consumption
growth is, under the theory, also uncorrelated with the cross-sectional distribution of con-
sumption growth.
To test this implication of full consumption insurance, Cochrane (1991) runs regres-
sions of the form
log(C1/Cj) =a+ $X(..1 +i=1..:,J, (4)
and tests the null hypothesis that $ =0.Here, Xj1 is a shock to household j's endow-
ment or earnings capacity that is assumed to be uncorrelated with measurement error in
consumption growth and preference variation across households.
Cochrane derives (4) under the assumption that household j exhibits constant relative





Differences in intertemporal substitution elasticities and discount rates imply differ-
ences in the volatility and average rates of consumption growth. If preferences are nonho-
mothetic, utility functions effectively differ across households at different wealth levels.
7Under this preference specification, conditions (3) become
p' '" =fi±.i.,j=1,...,J. (6) Pt
Taking logs and adding a measurement error t.o the growth of log consumption yields
iog(iti) =-[1ogQi±!)_iog(±') _log(pi)} (7)
Hence, if X(.1 is cross-sectionally independent of preference shifts (log(b÷1/bfl, 1, and p.7)
and of measurement error (ef+1),thenconsumption insurance implies that X(+1 will have
no explanatory power in regressions of the form (4). Cochrane also considers counterparts
to (4) that are suitable under more general specifications for preferences andpreference
variation. We take up these matters in the context of our synthetic panelspecifications
below.
In his empirical implementation, Cochrane uses data from the PanelSurvey of In-
come Dynamics to examine the response of household food consumption to changes in
the household head's health and employment status. He finds thatlong-term illness and
job loss indicators imply rejection of the consumption insurance hypothesis under the
maintained assumption that these variables are uncorrelated withpreference variation and
measurement error in the dependent variable. Townsend (1994)reports evidence against
the consumption insurance hypothesis using household-levelpanel data for three Indian
villages. Mace (199i) finds only mild evidence against theconsumption insurance hy-
pothesis using household-level data from the CEX, but Attanasio and Weber(1992) and
Nelson (1994) show that careful treatment ofmeasurement issues leads to sharp rejections
of the consumption insurance hypothesis in her data. In otherrelated work, Altonji et
al. (1992) reject the hypothesis of complete risksharing among extended family members,
and Lewis (1993) investigates whether thepattern of aggregate consumption growth rates
among countries conforms to the full insurance hypothesis.
B. Empirical Specification, Suitablefor SyntheiicPanelData
8Wherea.s Coclirane, Mace, Townsend and others use specifications like (4) to examine
the impact of individual-level endowment shocks on the distribution of household con-
sumption growth, we focus on systematic relative wage movements across observationally
distinct groups of households. The introduction outlines the advantages of a focus on this
type of wage structure variation. Here, we concentrate on deriving synthetic panel analogs
to (4) that exploit this type of wage variation.
Let Ch and W/ denote consumption and the wage rate for the jth household in group
i at time t. Our empirical analysis considers households defined by five-year birth cohorts
crossed with four educational attainment categories. Here, we simply refer to them as
groups.
After partitioning the data into I groups, take logs in (2), and avenge over the sample
of group-i households at time t to obtain








for i =1I and t =1 T. Here, and below; the hat symbol denotes a sample mean
quantity. It should be understood that the time index does not necessarily run over the
same periods for all groups.
Rewrite the sample average first-order conditions as
=logt1g—tI—Z1+cjt, 11,...,I, t1,...,T, (9)
where TiandZ are population counterparts to the corresponding sample means in (8), and
where e is an error term due to differences between population and sample means. This
formulation emphasizes that the sample mean of log marginal utility,differs from the
corresponding population mean due to finite sampling from a heterogeneous population. In
practice,alsodiffers from the population mean due to measurement error in variables
that determine the marginal utility of consumption. Under the theory, the population
quantity depends on a fixed time effect (log/it) common to all groups, a time-invariant
group effect (L1), and a third term that varies linearly with time (IL). If the distribution
of time discount factors p3 is identical across groups, then the third term becomes the
9same linear function of time for all groups. If this distribution differs across groups, then
the linear time trends also differ across groups.
Given a parametrization of the utility function, equation (9) leads to a "levels" regres-
sion specification for group-averaged data. Alternatively, we can derive a first-difference
specification from
—= (logPt— logp.) + Ct —s)A1+ a —ej,, (10)
where, as before, the error terms reflect deviations between population and sample means
and imperfect measurement of variables that determine the marginal utility ofconsump-
tion.
When preferences have the isoelastic form (5), the sample mean i7 becomes






wherevu is an error term due to deviations between sample and population means. Com-
bining this equation with (9) yields
•7Jlog(Cfl —— j€.(t) = logp—tR1—L1—B+ q— vj (11)
Now consider a regression of the sample mean log consumptionon a full set of time
and group fixed effects, plus a variable X, that captures time variation in relativegroup
endowments:
1ojjt=ci+gj+$Xj+eu, 1=1I, t1 T. (12)
Comparing (11) and (12), the consumption insurance hypothesis implies fi =0in this
regression specification, provided that X also satisfies a list of auxiliary statistical as-
sumptions. In particular, conditional on control variables in the regression equation, we
require that
(i) Xu is independent of measurement errors in log consumption;
10(ii) X is independentof cross-groupdifferences in thedistributionof thetime discount
factorsp1;
(iii) X1 is independent of cross-group differences in the distribution of intertemporal sub-
stitution parameters yJ; and
(iv) X is independent of variation in the mean preference disturbances
Restrictions(ii)-(iv) say that X1 must be independent of any preference variation
notcapturedby other controls in the regression specification. 'Assumption(ii) fails if,
coincidentally,groupswith highertimediscount factors happen to experience unusually
large relative wageincreases duringthe sample period. Similarly, (iii) fails if groups with
greater intertemporal substitution elasticities happen to experience unusually large rel-
ative wage increases. While we cannot nile out such coincidental relationships between
preference variation and relative wage movements, they would constitute an extremely im-
plausible interpretation of a consistent pattern of rejections of the null hypothesis, $= 0.
In contrast, in a specification that includes only time and group fixed effects as controls,
both theoretical and empirical considerations point to plausible reasons for a systematic
violation of (iv). We take up this matter in section III.
The restriction (i) on the measurement error process for X1 can fail because of sys-
tematic changes over time in the accuracy of the sampling frame for particular groups,
misclassification of individuals or households among groups, or the noise induced by finite
sampling from groups with heterogeneous populations. Similar measurement problems
arise in most econometric work. Our reliance on different cross-sectional data sets to con-
struct left and right side variables in (12) greatly diminishes the likelihood of nonzero
correlation between the dependent variable and measurement error in X,.




We could dispense with (ii) by introducing group-specific linear time trends in (12).
This modification to the regression specification is unappealing, because it would soak
up the persistent components of variation in candidate regressors X, i.e.,the persistent
components of relative wage movements in the empirical analysis.
11(log Pt— logp,) ÷(s — — — Dr1,)+ (Cu— €1,) — (v — vi.) (13)
Hence, the consumption insurance hypothesis implies $= 0in the regression specification
loju —lojj,=&g +f3.Xjg+ eu —eI =1,...,I and t =(t—3),...,T, (14)
provided that X. satisfies a list of statistical assumptions analogous to (i)-(iv).5
III. Specification Issues
Consumption insurance implies that relative wage movements have no effect on the
distribution of marginal utility growth. Testing this implication requires the maintained
assumption that measured relative wage movements not be coincidentally correlated with
omitted factors that drive a wedge between measured consumption growth and marginal
utility growth. This section treats potentially important sources of coincidental correlation
and their consequences for the empirical analysis.
A.Demograplizcs and Life-CycleEffecis
One important source of coincidental correlation involves systematic life-cycle varia-
tion in earnings capacity and in the marginal utility of consumption. Earningscapacity
increases with experience over much of the life cycle. For a partiallyoverlapping segment
of the life cycle, household-level consumption requirements also increase due to increases
in family size and age of children. Consequently, the typical cohortcan be expected to
exhibit a coincidental cot-relation between relativewage growth and relative consumption
growth over much of its life cycle. To control for this correlation, the empirical specifica-
tions include high-order polynomials in the head'sage plus measures of family size and
composition. In terms of the formal theory, these regression controls reflectcomponents
of the individual and group preference shifters, Wand
Both Mace and Townsend consider econometric specifications that follow fromex-
ponential preferences. Aggregating across household as above, one can easily show that
exponential preferences lead to versions of (12) and (14) in which the level of consumption
replaces the log of consumption.
12B. Preference Non.ceparabilitywiTh NontransferableLeisure
Consider the implications of relative wage movements when preferences are nonsep-
arable between consumption and leisure. To develop the argument, suppose that wage
movements reflect underlying disturbances to an aggregate production technology with
diminishing marginal factor products. Assume that nonmarket time is not transferable
across households, and that preferences exhibit diminishing marginal utility of leisure.
Then, if time devoted to market activity increases the marginal utility of consuming mar-
ket goods, groups with growing relative wages also experience relative consumption growth
under a Pareto-optimal allocation. It follows that, even under a Pareto-optimal allocation,
$exceedszero in specifications like (12) and (14) that fail to condition on labor supply.
Consequently, the omission of labor supply (or leisure) controls can lead to false rejections
of the consumption insurance hypothesis.
To derive a synthetic panel specification that conditions on leisure, consider the gen-
erai.ization of (5)1
U[C(,1I —L,Sfl= b(C1)''C— (5')
where Hdenotesthe time endowment in hours, and L denotes hours worked.6 This
specification implies that the sample mean log marginal utility function, Vi,, contains the
additional term EJEI()(1 + ')log(H —Lfl/#i(i).The appropriate level and difference
regression specifications now become
loj =a,+ gj + log(— L1) + f3Xj + ei,, and (12')
log C1 —logC,,, =at+ '[log(H— L) —log(W—L,,)] +$Xu + et —e.,. (14')
Thus, when preferences are nonseparable and leisure is nontransferable, one might
test the consumption insurance hypothesis by investigating whether fi= 0in regressions
6 The parameter restrictions b c0and y, c—1imply that nonmarket time and
consumption expenditures are substitutes, as presumed in the text.
13like (12') and (14') that condition on leisure.'Unfortunately, when preferences are
nonseparable, using a wage measure as the K, variable in (12') or (14') gives rise to
an identification problem. Recall that the social planner equates the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure to the wage for households at an interior
solution. This intratemporal first-order condition has the same form as (12') when we
subàtitute the wage for Xg.Likewise,the first difference of this condition has the same
form as (14') when we substitute the first difference of the wage for X1. Consequently, we
cannot use relative wage movements to test the consumption insurance hypothesis in (12')
and (14') without additional information on he substitutability between consumption and
leisure. We achieved identification in (12) and (14) by relying upon the assumption of
separable preferences to exclude leisure.
We suggest two approaches to the identification problem that arises with nonseparable
preferences. The first consists in focussing on a sample for which male labor supply is
believed to be highly inelastic. This consideration is one reason we restrict the sample to
households headed by adult males between 23 and 59. We also report results for samples
restricted to households headed by males between 30 and 55 and to households who have at
least a high school education.if we believe that male labor supply is highly inelastic, and
Using (12') or (14') to test the consumption insurance hypothesis under nonseparable
preferences requires, in addition to (i)-(iv), a further auxiliary assumption: Kg is inde-
pendent of cross-group differences in the distribution of the J.Wecan dispense with this
assumption by allowing for group-specific slope terms on the leisure controls in (12') or
(14').
Specifications like (12) and (14) can also lead to an upwardly biased estimate of fi,
if preferences entail a nonseparability between householdconsumption and wife's leisure.
Suppose we test the hypothesis that fi =0in (12) or (14) using the husband's wage for Xii.
If relative wage movements for husbands and wivescovary positively, and if reductions in
the wife's leisure increase the marginal utility of householdconsumption, then $exceeds
zero under a Pareto-optimal allocation. Section VI below shows that husbands' and wives'
relative wage movements exhibit strong positive covariation inour sample.
Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991) present evidence that less-educated men exhibit
greater labor supply elasticity.
14we control for female leisure, then a finding that male wage growth enters the equation for
consumption growth constitutes convincing evidence against the consumption insurance
hypothesis. '°
Alternativelywe can ask the question: can we explain the observed comovements
among relative wages1 consumption and hours worked appealing to nonseparability be-
tween consumption and wages? Our second approach to the identification problem entails
calibrating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to construct
the marginal utility of consumption. The parameters of the MRS are chosen to yield val-
ues for labor supply elasticities consistent with existing evidence. We can then estimate
equations like (12) or (14) with the (log of) the marginal utility of consumption (rather
than log consumption) on the left hand side of the regression, and test the hypothesis that
relative wages enter these equations. A rejection of the null would be an indication that
the consumption insurance hypothesis cannot be salvaged by appealing to nonseparability
between consumption and leisure.
C. Leisure Transfcrtzbility via Markd Transactions
Our emphasis on the potential importance of conditioning on leisure when testing the
consumption insurance hypothesis differs from previous research. Cochrane (1991) and
Townsend (1994), in particular, argue that free transferability of leisure across households
implies the suitability of their consumption insurance tests in the face of nonseparable
preferences. This argument fails when the social planner's optimal leisure allocation across
households is implemented through market transactions. These transactions for time-
saving goods and services are recorded as additional consumption expenditures in the data.
Examples include prepared food, personal services that cover laundry and other household
chores, and expenditures on certain forms of transportation. Aside from time-saving goods
and services, more expensive clothing and other market goods are often complementary
inputs for market work activities. These observations bear out a problematic aspect of
'°Altugand Miller (1990) consider preferences defined over consumption, husband's
leisure and wife's leisure, but they assume separability between consumption and male
leisure.
15previous consumption insurance tests that fail to condition on leisure.
Appendix A analyzes a model of leisure transferability via market transactions. The
model posits two types of market-produced commodities: goods that generate utility di-
rectly and time-saving goods. Households combine time-saving goods and nonmarket time
to produce effective leisure. Shocks to an aggregate production technology drive rela-
tivé wage movements. The social planner chooses hours worked in the market sector and
quantities of the two market-produced goods to implement a Pareto-optimal allocation.
As before, an optimal allocation entails identical growth rates across households in the
marginal utility of consumption.
In this model, the mechanism for tranferring leisure across households inducesa non-
separability between leisure and measured consumption, even if the underlying preferences
are separable. In addition, thismechanism induces positive covariation across households
between relative wage growth and relative growth in measured consumption.Hence, if
expenditures on time-saving goods are the mechanism by which an optimal allocation is
implemented, then testing the consumption insurance hypothesis with specifications like
(12) and (14) involves a bias in favor of the alternative hypothesis fi> 0.Since changes
in health status, employment status, and income are also correlated with hoursworked
and expenditures on time-saving goods, the consumption insurance tests carriedout by
Cochrane, Mace and Townsend suffer from the same specification problem and biasagainst
the null hypothesis. Hence, one can construe their evidenceagainst consumption insurance
as a failure of the maintained hypothesis that leisure is freely transferablethrough some
extra-market institution. An analogous point applies to Abel and Kotlikoff's(1992) test
of the intergenerational altruism hypothesis in cohort data.
In principle, one could address the bias causedby time-saving goods by associating
them with particular subsets of commodities observed in the data.One could then estimate
(12) and (14) for consumption meaures based only onutility-producing goods. Given a
correct identification of time-saving goods (and suitable separabilityassumptions), this
specification would provide an unbiased estimate of $underthe consumption insurance
null. As a practical empirical matter, however, it would be difficultto create a satisfactory
partition of observed commodities into utility-producing andtime-saving goods. For this
16reason, we pursue the approaches setoutin the preceding section. We interpret the model
with nonseparable preferences and nontransferable leisure as a reduced form of the model
with leisure transferability via market transactions.
Our analysis of wages, time-saving goods, and effective leisure can be viewed as an
application of the general theory of household commodity production (Becker, 1965, es-
pecially section IV). Juster and Stafford (1991) summarize several pieces of empirical
evidence that support the importance of the wage-induced substitution effects stressed in
our analysis.
D. Other Preference Nonseparabilities
Our empirical investigation focuses on the consumption of nondurable goods and
services. If preferences are not separable between these components of consumption and
other components, then the left side of equations (12) and (14) mismeasure the marginal
utility of consumption. While this mismeasurement constitutes a potential source of bias,
we do not think it is a serious concern for two reasons. First, the different groups of
households in our synthetic panels are unlikely to experience very different patterS of
relative price movements for, say, durable goods. Second, even if the relative prices
of durables vary systematically across groups in our synthetic panel, there is no apparent
reason why these omitted price movements would be correlated with the relative prices of
leisure (i.e., relative wages) that we use to test the consumption insurance hypothesis. In
other words, the auxilliary statistical assumption (iv) specified in section II.B is unlikely
to fail. If we were to condition on the consumption services derived from durable goods,
we would neediessly dilute the power of our tests.
IV. Econometric Issues
.4.The Error Structure and Estimation Methods
" Wehave exploited the highly detailed information on household consumption in the
CEX to construct group-specific price indexes over nondurables and services. These indexes
revealed only trivial cross-group variation in inflation rates, and so we did not pursue the
matter.
17Under the null hypothesis of full insurance against publicly observable shocks, the
equation errors in (12) and (14)ariseonly from preference variation and measurement error.
The expectational errors for the uninsurable aggregate shocks are captured by time effects.
Hence, if the X1 in (12) and (14) were measured without error —andmaintaining the
awcilliary assumptions about preference variation —OLSwould deliver consistent coefficient
estimates.
Sampling variation alone, however, induces measurement error in the sample mean
quantities that appear as regressors in (12) and (14). Of course, sampling variation is
unlikely to be the only source of measurement error in the constructedregressors. To
address the potential inconsistency of the OLS estimator forcaused by measurement
error, we devise an instrumental variable strategy for estimating (12) and (14).
To develop an approprate W strategy, represent the regressionequation involving the
unobserved, true variables as
=controls+ $Ae* + (15)
where kXIt —X_for k >0,with A0X1 X, and where 0andVP denote
true values of log consumption and log wages, respectively. C and Wrepresent the corre-
sponding observed quantities. Under the null, the onlyreasonsto instrument for Ak
are sampling variation and measurement error in W,.
Because we rely on different data sources to construct the C and Wvariables, sampling
variation and measurement error in W are uncorrelated with theequation error in the
regression model (15). Since our regression specifications entail differencedquantities (or
year and group fixed effects in the levels case), a reasonable error model for the logwage
measure is
=+U, (16)
where the error u satisfies Cov(ug,*j,_*) =0for all k, Cov(u1t,C1,1_*) =0for all k,
Cov(u,t,u,t_k) =Ofork0, andCov(uI(,uI.,,_k) =Ofori9. Giventheseassuxnptions,
we describe an IV estimation strategy designed to perform well, whileminimizing the loss
of observations due to instrumenting. Forreasons that will become apparent, we treat the
levels, one-year difference, and k-year difference specificationsseparately.
18Before describingour IV estimators,onefurtherobservation is inorder. Under the
null hypothesisof full insurance against observable relative wage movements, and given
the postulated measurement-error structure for (16), lags and leadsofgroup means are
valid instruments for the contemporaneous wage measure in (15).
instrumentChoice for the Levels Specification
Thiscase fits the classical measurement error model. Thus, if we estimate (15) with
Ic =0by OLS, we will obtain a downward biased estimator for $.Toaddress this problem,
consider the following instrument Z1 for W14:
if Wj_1 is unobserved;
= (1/2)(W+i + W1,1_1) if both W1.1 and W1,4_1 are observed; (17)
I.W_1 if W1 isunobserved.
The appeal of this scheme is three-fold. First, no observations are lost due to instrumenting.
Second, the averaging over the immediate past and immediate future values of the wage
meaure reduces the noise component in the instrument that arises from sampling variation
and measurement error. Third, since true relative wages change slowly over time, we
anticipate a high correlation between the true current wage and the measured wages in
adjacent years.
Instrument Choice for One-YearDifference Specification
Suppressingthe i subscript for expositional convenience, we have
=(flJ+ u) —(W...1+ ug_).
It follows that the once-Lagged value of jW is not a valid instrument for 1W in the
regression,
Aj C11 =controls+ fl1W11 + eg,
because both A1P/4 and iWg_1 involve the error u4_1.
Thus, pursuing the same approach as before, consider the following instrument for
i 1W.2 if A1W4_2 is unobserved;
Z = (1/2)(A W11.2 + áW1_2)ifboth a11w12andA1W1_2 are observed;(18)
1A1W4_2 ifaW11 is unobserved.
19While thisinstrumentingscheme shares the first two virtues described above for the levels
scheme, it suffers from a serious shortcoming. True changes in wages contain much less
persistence through time than true levels. Thus, Z may not be highly correlated with
W.In practice, IV estimates based on (18) produced enormous standard errors.
In light of this shortcoming, consider an alternative instrument that brackets the time
interval of the true change. Let
Z =A3W1. (19)
Thisinstrument involves ue+i and Ut_3but notU1andUt_I.Sinceour CPS-based wage
measures extend further back in time than the CEX-based consumption measures, (19)
entails the loss of only one observation per group.
Instrument Chotce for k-Year Difference Specifications (k ￿ 2)
In this case, we could pursue the basic idea behind (17), and define an instrument that
involves averaging immediate lags and leads of k—year differences. However, the benefts of
two-sided averaging are less pronounced than in the levels case. Hence, we use thesimple
instrumenting scheme,
Z =SkWI_I. (20)
This scheme entails no loss of observations (except possibly foryoung cohorts), since our
wage data extends further back in time than our consumption data.
B. £at,matzng the Covariance Matrix
The regression residuals in (12) and (14) are likely to be characterizedby heteroscedas-
ticity and (for the difference specifications) by autocorrelation.Heteroscedasticity arises
from variation across year-group cells in the extent ofmeasurement error, the number of
sampling units, and the degree of within-group heterogeneity. Differencingover k-year
intervals induces a kth-order movingaverage term, as evident from (14) or (14'). We use
a robust method (alaWhite) to form a consistent estimator for the covariance matrix
in the levels specification. In the differencespecifications, we use a more elaborate co-
variance matrix estimator that is consistent underheteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Appendix B supplies details.
20V. The Data
A. The Consumer Expenditure Stirvey and the Currenl Population Survey
Our empirical analysis draws on two large-scale, public-use micro data sources. The
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) gathers information on income, demographic char-
acièristics and expenditure patterns of consumer units. A consumer unit is a group of
individuals living in the same household who are related, or who share at least two of
three major expense categories: food, housing, and other living expenses. The CEX also
contains information on labor market outcomes for individual household members. Since
1980, the CEX has been carried out on a continuous basis with monthly rotation, surveying
approximately 5,000 households per year.
Barring attrition, each CEX household is surveyed for four consecutive quarters. A
quarterly interview elicits information about expenditure patterns during each of the pre-
ceding three months. Information about income and labor market outcomes refers to the
twelve months preceding the interview. Our investigation uses CEX data for calendar
years 1980 to 1990.
The Annual Demographic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) gath-
ers information on household income, demographic characteristics, and the labor market
outcomes of individual members. The survey, carried out in March, elicits information
about income and labor market outcomes for the preceding calendar year. The March
CPS files contain this information for roughly 40,000 to 60,000householdsper year. Our
investigation uses CF'S data for calendar years 1975 to 1990.
The large CPS sample sizes constitute a major advantage to combining information
from these two data sources. By constructing wage and leisure measures from the Cl'S
rather than the CEX, we greatly reduce the sampling error component in our synthetic
panel regressors. Aside from considerations of sample size, CPS income and earnings data
are superior to the corresponding CEX data (Cutler and Katz, 1991).
B. Forming SyniheAic Panel Groups
Our empirical analysis restricts attention to households with a male head (all married
21couples, plus single male consumers and a few households with a single male parent). The
only exception occurs when we use wage figures for all women. In the CEX data, we form
synthetic panel groups based on the birth year and educational attainment of the male
household head. We follow the same practice in the CPS, except when constructing the all
women sample. In that case only, we define groups of women in terms of their own birth
year and educational attainment.
Birth cohorts are defined in terms of five-year bands. The oldest cohort contains per-
sons born between March 1925 and February 1930, where the cutoff month is chosen to
maximize conformity between the CEX and CPS.'2 We consider four educational attain-
ment categories: less than twelve years of schooling, exactly twelve years, more than twelve
but less than sixteen years, and sixteen or more years of schooling. Our synthetic panel
groups result by crossing these four education categories with the five-year birth cohorts.
C. Consumption and Wage Measures
Our consumption measure equals household expenditures on nondurable goods and
services We exclude expenditures on durables, health, education and housing. The main
motivation for excluding these components is to avoid treating dynamics and other prob-
lems connected with durability. In addition, the CEX includes only out-of-pocket health
expenditures,not insurance payments. We deflate group consumption expenditures using
group-specific price indexes that we constructed from the detailed expenditures data in
the CEX. It turns out, however, thatcross-group variation in inflation rates is tiny, so that
we effectively applied the same deflator to all groups)3
In constructing the consumption measure, we exclude nonurban households, those
residing in student housing, those with a male head older than 59 or younger than 23, and
12TheCPS records age at the March survey date. The CEX recordsage at each quarterly
interview. Hence, increments in reportedage between interviews enable us to bound
birth dates within three-month intervals in the CEX. Uncertainty about the exact date of
birth in the CEX implies a theoretical rate of misallocation to five-year birth cohorts of
approximately one percent under our procedures. In practice, missing and erroneous age
responses in the CEX generate a larger misallocation rate. hThestandard deviation across groups of the 1980-to-1990 log change in the price
indexes is about one-half of one percent.
22those with incomplete income responses. 14Weexclude nonurban households because the
CEX did not sample them in 1982 and 1983. By excluding young heads (and those residing
in student housing), we minimize migration to higher educational attainment categories
as a cohort ages. By excluding old heads, we minimize the impact of retirement and
retirement choices on our sample.
Since CEX households are interviewed on a staggered basis, consumption observations
for a typical household straddle two adjacent calendar years. Our annual consumption
measures weight each household in proportion to the number of monthly observations that
fall into the calendar year. For example, a household interviewed in July of 1990 contributes
six monthly expenditure observations to each of the 1989 and 1990 consumption measures.
We measure hourly earnings from the CPS, computed as annual earnings divided by
the product of weeks worked and usual hours per week. We converted to real wages using
the GDP deflator for personal consumption expenditures. We excluded persons who were
students or in the military for at least part year, those who failed the age restriction
described above, those who reported self-employment as their primary source of earnings,
and those who earned less than 75% of the minimum wage. We imputed an estimate of
the conditional mean earnings for top-coded individuals using the same procedure as Katz
and Murphy (1992). In constructing labor supply measures, we include the self employed.
Table 1 displays cell count summary statistics for the wage and consumption measures
used in our study. The large cell counts for the CPS-based wage measures bear out one
important advantage of our empirical strategy. Namely, the CPS enables us to construct
wage regressors with much smaller sampling error than we could obtain from CEX-based
wage measures. The sampling error component of the CEX-based consumption measures
is a less serious concern, because consumption is the dependent variable in our regression
specifications.
VI. Relative Wage and Consumption Behavior
14Itis standard practice among BLS statisticians to exclude CEX observations with
incomplete income responses, when computing means, on the basis of data quality.
23A. Movements in Relative Wages
Table2 summarizes movements in men's real hourly wages by birth cohort and edu-
cation group. u Each panel describes real wage movements for all cohorts in a particular
education category relative to the 1980 value for the 1945-50 birth cohort in the same ed-
ucation category. Several types of information about the wage structure can be read from
thulable. Looking across a single row traces out the cross-sectional age profile ofwages
for the indicated year and education category. Looking down a column traces out the
evolution of real wages for a particular cohort-education group. For example, the 1950-55
cohort of men with fewer than twelve years of schooling suffered a real wage decline of
eleven log points between 1980 and 1990. Comparisons across columns reveal differences
in the evolution of real wages between cohorts and between cohort-educationgroups.
The most pronounced relative wage movements in Table 2 involve differences by ed-
ucational attainment. Among men with fewer than twelve years of schooling, realwages
fell between 1980 and 1990 for all birth cohorts. Realwages declined by about ten per-
cent for cohorts that satisfy the age restrictions throughout the decade. Realwages also
declined over the decade for all cohorts of high school educatedmen, although the de-
clines were typically more modest. Among men with some post-secondary education, real
wages increased substantially for the youngest cohorts and modestly for older cohorts.
Finally, among college-educated men real wages rose for all cohorts, including rapid real
wage gains for the youngest cohorts. To pick out an extreme comparison, wages for the
1950-53 birth cohort of college educated men rose by 44 log points relative towages of
their contemporaries with fewer than twelveyears of schooling.
Table 2 shows more modest between-cohort movements in relativewages within most
education groups. However, among men with more than twelveyears of schooling, the
younger cohorts experienced notably more rapid wage growth than the older cohorts. The
between-cohort variation in wage growth is especially pronouncedamong college educated
men.
Patterns of relative wage movementsamong birth-education groups of women are
Here, and throughout the paper, we use only the observations for which all members
of the group satisfy the age restrictions in the indicatedyear.
24broadly similar during the 1980s.Table3 highlights this similarity, summarizing the
covariation of wages betweenmen andwomen in the same birth-education group and
betweenhusbands andwives.Thetable reports, for example, regressions of five-year
changesinmean wages for men on the corresponding changes in mean wages for women
in thesame birth-education group.Themen/women regressions classifymen and women
intagroups based on their separate characteristics, whereas the husbands/wives regressions
classify both sexes into groups based on the husband's characteristics. Table entries in
parentheses report results for specifications that include cohort fixed effects and thereby
isolate the between-education component of the covariation in men's and women's wage
movements. The large positive slope coefficients and the high R2 values in the table bear
out the strong similarity of relative wage movements among men and women during both
halves of the decade.
In summary, wages for highly educated men rose sharply during the I 980s relative to
wages of their less educated contemporaries. These relative wage movments involved real
wage increases for men with a college education and real wage declines for men with twelve
or fewer years of schooling. Between-cohort variation in wage growth was modest among
less-educated men and pronounced among the most educated men, with more rapid wage
growth for younger cohorts. Finally, the wage growth patterns among men were largely
reinforced by the relative wage movements among women and wives. The large relative
wage movements among birth-education groups of men, and the reinforcing pattern of
movements among women, indicate that our synthetic panel data offer ample leverage
for testing the consumption insurance hypothesis and estimating the effects of systematic
relative wage movements on the household consumption distribution.
B. Movements in Relative Consumption
Table 4 summarizes movements in real household consumption by birth cohort and
educational attainment of the male head. Although the consumption data are notably
noisier than the wage data, some key patterns are discernible. Among the least educated,
real consumption declines sharply over part or all of the decade for the 1945-50 and earlier
cohorts. Among the high school educated, real consumption also declines sharply for
25several cohorts. In contrast, among the more educated, real consumption shows modest
to sharp gains for all but the oldest cohorts.
Table 5 condenses the information on real consumption growth by educational at-
tainment status. This table reports simple means of the cohort-specific real consumption
changes in Table 4. The results reveal a sharp, systematic pattern of rapid relative con-
sumption growth for more educated groups during both halves of the decade. The least
educated experienced a striking 15% decline in real household consumption from 1980 to
1985 and essentially no change over the remainder of the decade. The college educated
experienced reasonably strong consumption growth over both halves of the decade.
Although not shown here, we have also examined year-to-year movements in real
household consumption by cohort-education groups. The more detailed examination re-
veals that consumption declines among the less educated are concentrated in the early
1980s. After 1983 or 1984, consumption levels appear fairly flat for most cohorts of the
least educated and slowly rising for most cohorts of the high school educated. Among
the college educated, consumption by the younger cohorts rises strongly throughout the
decade
These descriptive results constitute a prima fade case against the consumption insur-
ance hypothesis. While we have not placed household consumption on an adult equivalence
basis, it is hard to believe that exogenousdifferencesin the growth of household consump-
tion requirements explain the sharp differences in consumption growth rates by education
category. It is also noteworthy that real household consumption falls absolutely for some
groups while rising absolutely for others. This pattern, whereby consumption moves in
opposite directions for different groups, points towards the likely untenability of the con-
sumption insurance hypothesis for any stable parametrization of preferences under which
agents care about consumption risk.
C. Comovements between Relative Wages an4 Consumption
Figure 1 plots the annual differences of mean log consumption against mean log wages
for the cohort-education groups in our sample. The plotted values are residuals from
regressions on a cubic polynomial in age and year fixed effects. The year effects control
26for the uninsurableaggregateshocks in our sample, and the age polynomial represents a
crude control for systematic life-cycle variation in household consumption requirements.
The theory developed in section II delivers this specification when preferences are isoelastic
and separable between consumption and leisure.
The scatterplot in Figure 1 conforms well to the implications of the consumption in-
surance hypothesis or any other theory that predicts smoothing of high-frequency earnings
variation. The least squares regression slope is mildly positive but insignificantly different
from zero. As indicated by the low IV value, there is no apparent relationship between
year-to-year relative wage and consumption movements among cohort-education groups.
Figure 2 shows an analogous scatterplot for ten-year first differences in our sample.
This figure reveals a remarkably close relationship between low-frequency relative wage
and consumption movements during the 1980s. The slope coefficient equals .92 with a
standard error of .12. Cross-group differences in men's relative wage growth explain a
remarkable 82% of the considerable variation in relative consumption growth. The labels
on the individual points in the scatterplot indicate that the between-education components
of relative wage and consumption movements drive the regression line.
This second scatterplot points to a spectacular failure of the consumption insurance
hypothesis with respect to publicly observable, systematic components of relative wage
variation. Indeed, the evidence is highly favorable to an extreme alternative hypothesis
under which relative consumption growth equals relative wage growth. The sharp contrast
between Figures 1 and 2 also highlights another important advantage of our empirical
strategy. By drawing on cross-sectional data sets to construct long synthetic panels, we
can identifr persistent components of endowment shocks. Comparing Figures 1 and 2,
it is the persistent movements in relative endowments (i.e., low frequency relative wage
variation) that drives relative consumption movements.
Figure 3 shows a scatterplot that corresponds to the levels specification (12). The
plotted values are residuals from regressions on a quartic polynomial in age plus a maxi-
mally linearly independent set of year and group fixed effects. Given that these residuals
represent deviations from group-year means for an (unbalanced) panel that contains as
many as eleven annual observations per group, we also interpret this scatterplot as de-
27picting the low-frequency covariation between relative wages and consumption. The least
squares regression line in Figure 3 exhibits a large, positive slope and is tightly estimated,
thereby confirming the failure of the consumption insurance hypothesis in Figure 2.
We know from Figure 2 that the covaz-iation in relative wages and consumption across
education groups generates a sharp rejection of the consumption insurance hypothesis.
Figure 4 shows that the between-cohort covariation within education groups also generates
a sharp rejection of the hypothesis. In this figure, we plot by education group the same
residuals that appear in Figure 316Threeof the four education groups generate large and
significantly positive slope coefficients on relative wages. The large cross-cohort variation
in wage growth among the college educated generates an especially stark rejection of the
consumption insurance hypothesis.
In summary, these scatterplots provide visually compelling evidence that the house-
hold consumption distribution is poorly insulated from persistent relative wage movements
among birth-education groups. Our evidence is consistent with the view that the con-
suinption distribution is well insulated from transitory relative wage movements, perhaps
through the smoothing mechanisms envisioned by life cycle and permanent income theo-
ries. The more formal econometric investigation carried out below shows how these results
are affected by inclusion of additional controls, women's wages, nonseparable preferences,
alternative samples, and instrumental variables estimation.
VH. Econometric Results
A. The Synthetic Panel Specifications
This section reports the results of estimating several versions of equations (12) and
(14) using synthetic panel data. We typically begin with a benchmark specification that
contains year effects, a polynomial in age, plusgroup fixed effects for the levels specifica-
]6Thatis, we constrain the age polynomial to be the same for all educationgroups.
This procedure reflects our belief in smallexogenous differences across education groups
in the shape of life-cycle consumption requirements.
28tions. We then consider alternative specifications that add wage and leisure measures for
women (or wives) and controls for family size and composition. We report OLS and IV
results for a sample of all households with a 23-to-59 year old male head and for a sample
of married couples only. In addition to the levels specification (i2) we estimated k-year
difference specifications (14) for all k from ito 9. We report a selected set of the difference
specifications to illustrate the general pattern of results.
The wage measure for women represents an alternative source of endowment shocks
to the household. The leisure controls for women reflect our concern for a potentially
important nonseparability between household consumption and the leisure of women or
wives. We experimented with several measures of female leisure without much effect on
the results. The reported results use CT'S-based means of the logarithm of annual leisure
hours, defined as 52 times 126 minus annual hours worked.
Our family size and composition controls are the (mean of) log family size, the number
of adults, the numbn of children under three years of age, and the number of other children.
These variables are intended to capture life-cycle preference variation that differs over time
and across groups. On a priori grounds, it is not dear that these controls belong in the
specification. While we believe that consumption requirements vary exogenously over the
life cycle, time and group variaüou in the shape of life cycle consumption requirements
could be driven by variation in relative wages. Thus, the indusion of these controls stacks
the deck in favor of the consumption insurance hypothesis. In any case, their inclusion
represents an easy and flSble alternative to an adult equivalence scheme.
The number of available observations varies with the control set, the estimation
method, and the differencing interval. To facilitate comparability, the reported results
use the largest sample available across all specifications and control sets, given a particular
differencing interval. This leads to a loss of observations for some specificaitons; results
were not affected by these minor sample changes.
In carrying out instrumental variables estimation, we instrument the wage measures
using the schemes described in section W.B. We instrument the leisure and demographic
variables in an analogous manner. In the difference specifications, we also use the group
fixed effects as instruments for the demographic variables.
29B. Results for the Level Specifications
Table 6.1 contains results for the level specifications. The first two lines of Table 6.1
show, for the benchmark specification, an OLS coefficient estimate on malewages of .65
in the male-headed sample and .42 in the married couples sample. As expected in the
presence of measurement error, the corresponding IV estimates are considerably larger
—0181and 0.59. 17Theseslope coefficients are precisely estimated and provide strong
evidence against the hypothesis of full insurance against publicly observable relativewage
movements. The estimates are closer to unity —indicatingthat relative wage changes
translate one-for-one into relative consumption changes —thanto zero.
The next two lines addfemalewage measures. As expected from Table 3, the collinear-
ity between male and female wage movements inflates the standard errors on the individual
slope coefficients, especially under IV estimation. The OLS results reiterate the bench-
mark results, but the individual IV coefficients are too imprecisely estimated to drawany
inferences.
Lines 5 and 6 add controls for female leisure to the kenchmarkspecification. The
results indicate that increases in female leisure reduce householdconsumption expendi-
tures, consistent with our prior views about the nature of preference nonseparability, but
inclusion of this control does not mitigate the size or statisticalsignificance of male wage
effects.
Finally, the remaining lines add family size and compositionvariables, with and with-
out the controls for female leisure. Once again, the coefficienton male wages is little
affected, although the IV estimates for this coefficientare less precise when we include the
composition variables.
C. Resij its for the dzfference specifications
Tables 6.2-6.4 report results for theone-year, five-year and eight-year differencing
intervals. The results for two-year differencingintervals, like the results for one-year inter-
vals, show no consistent effects of relativewage movements on relative consumption. For
The IV results are virtually unaffected whenwe use only lagged wage values to con-
struct instruments.
30differencing intervals of three or more years, we find sizable and statistically significant
departures from the consumption insurance hypothesis, as illustrated by tables 6.3 and
6.4. Relative wage movements over these longer differencing intervals are associated with
large relative consumption movements. These patterns in the estimation results emerged
for all sets of controls we considered, with the exception of IV estimates of specifications
that include female wages. This latter specification yielded imprecisely estimated slope
coefficients on male and female wage measures. In short, results obtained for differencing
intervals of three or more years closely parallel results for the level specifications.
D. Can Nonseparabiliiy Salvage theConsumphouInsurance Hypothesis?
As stressed in section III, one cannot test the hypothesis that men's relative wage
movements have no effect on the distribution of marginal utility growth while simultane-
ously controlling for nonseparability between men's leisure and household consumption,
unless one brings additional identifying information to bear. The tests in Table 6 achieve
indentification by maintaining strongseparability between consumption and men's leisure.
We now investigate whether the previous evidence against the consumption insurance hy-
pothesis hinges on the separability assumption.
%Ve proceed by considering nonseparable preference specifications of the form (5'),
which can easily be generalized to account for female leisure. This specification is quite
simple and probably inadequate for capturing many important features of the interaction
between consumption and labor supply. However, we aim only to assess whether a plausible
degree of complementarity between consumption and men's labor supply can rationalize
the covariance between men's relative wages and household consumption. "Plausible"
means consistent with available evidence on male labor supply elasticities. In particular,
we experimented with values of-y and that correspond to an intertemporal substitution
elasticity between 0.3 and 0.6 and an uncompensated wage elasticity (evaluated at sample
means) between -0.3 and 0.3. Corresponding values for the compensated elasticity
lie between 0.21 and 0.82. These figures are roughly consistent with available evidence
ISDenotethe labor supply elasticities with respect to wage movements by eforthe
uncompensated elasticity, q for the compensated elasticity, and 'forthe intertemporal
31(Pencavel, 1986).
Given values for y and ,weused the implied marginal utility of consumption,
log(Cf)+ 1log(ft —Li),as the dependent variable in regression specifications oth-
erwise identical to the ones reported in Tables 6. The results were highly similar to Tables
6.1-6.4, and they are available upon request. From these results, we infer that our evidence
against the consumption insurance hypothesis cannot be rationalized by a plausible degree
of coinplementarity between consumption and men's labor supply.
As another check on the potential importance of nonseparable preferences, we con-
sidered samples restricted to men with relatively inelastic labor supply. To the extent
that labor supply is inelastic, there is little scope for complementarity between work and
consumption to drive variation in household consumption. A large empirical literature
holds that prime-age men supply labor inelastically with respect to the wage. Hence, we
considered samples restricted to men between 30 and 55. Since some evidence suggests
that less educated men exhibit greater supply elasticity, we also considered samples further
restricted to exclude groups with fewer than twelve years of schooling.
Tables 7 reports results for a sample restricted to all men between 30 and 55 who have
at least a high school education. (Results for the corresponding sample of married couples
and the sample that includes the least educated men are highly similar.) Due to smaller







where M = U,,/U, 1=OM/3c, Mt = a/8L, H is labor supply, L is leisure, c is
consumption, and inisthe wage. We evaluated Eandiatc = 23,000, in=11, H = 2080,
and L = 5000 —2080.For instance, ..=—3, = —4 implies $=—0.037, q = 0.55 and
= 0.5.
32sample sizes, the coefficient estimates are slightly less precise than before,but the effects
of male wages on consumption strongly confirm the previous results. If anything, the null
hypothesis is even more consistently rejected. Even the annual difference specifications
often show statistically significant evidence against the null hypothesis when estimated by
instrumental variables.
B. Assessing Ike CovnovemenI between Re/alive Wages and Consumplion
We interpret the results in Tables 6 and 7 as a spectacular rejection of the hypothesis
of consumption insurance against publicly observable relative wage movements. Regardless
of how one interprets these results, it is useful to precisely quantify the fraction of relative
consumption variation explained by relative wage variation. Because of sampling errors in
the synthetic panel variables, R2 values in the fitted regressions lie below one, even when
the true relationship between consumption and wages exhibits a perfect fit. To address
this difficulty, we estimate an upper bound on the R2 value in the presence of sampling
error. We then compare the actual fl2 values for the synthetic panel regressions tothe
estimated upper bounds to assess the closeness of the consumption-wage relationship.
Suppose that (classical) measurement error and sampling variation are the only source
of the equation error in regressions (12) and (14). Suppose further, for the sake of simplicity,
that these errors are homoscedastic. Under these conditions, the R2 value in the level





and c are the within-cell variances of log consumption and X41 in equation (12),
N and Nr are the cell sizes of the sampies used to compute average consumptionand
average X, and c is the variance of log consumption acrosscellsnot explained by the
regression controls. Equation (22) reflects the orthogonality of the measurement errorsin
consumption and wages, as implied by their construction from independent samples. Fpr
33the difference specifications theoretical bounds can be derived in a similar fashion, but
taking into account the MA structure induced by the measurement error in the levels.
Table 8 reports actual and estimated upper bounds on ft2 for the simplest specifica-
tions that include only male wages, after regressing out the effects of the age polynomial
and year effects plus group effects for the level specification. The actual B2 values equal
the, fraction of residual consumption variation accounted for by men's wages. The upper
bound values are given by (21) and (22) for the level specifications and by their analogs
for the difference specifications. We compute (21) and (22) separately for each cell, evalu-
ating at the IV estimates of /3 (reported in Table 6) and the cell-specific values of u/N
and o,/N,. We compute e as the cross-cell variance in the consumption measure after
regressing out the controls. The upper bound values reported in Table 8 are averages of
the cell-specific values.
The results in Table S make two points. First, sampling variation reduces the at-
tainableft2valueby3-18%, depending on the length of the differencing interval. Thus
sampling variation in the CPS- and CEX-based means induces a nontrivial, but modest,
deterioration in the potential goodness of fit. Second, male relative wage movements alone
explain a large fraction of variation in relative household consumption movements at longer
differencing intervals. The table suggests that, over the decade as a whole, variation in
men's pre-tax hourly wages across cohort-education groups was the single most important
factor driving changes in the cross-group distribution of household consumption (for the
population encompassed by our selection criteria).
'TIII. Welfare Implications
How large are the welfare losses implied by differences among cohort-educationgroups
in consumption growth rates? How large are the welfare losses implied by the failure to
insulate the consumption distribution from relative wage shifts among cohort-education
groups? In this section, we propose and implement a procedure for addressing these
questions. Our welfare calculations do not reflect uninsured events that occur prior to
1980 or prior to age 23. Nor do they reflect idiosyncratic components of consumption and
34Appendix B: Estimatingthe Covariance Matrix
The asymptoticvariance-covariance matrix of/ in equation (12)estimated by instru-
mental variables is given by
AsyV($)=PZZX'Z(Z'Z)'Z'11Z(Z'ZY'Z'XPn, (3d)
whereZis the matrixof instruments, X is the regressor matrix, and fl = EVeI.
Thedimension of fl isE5 Tj,where Tj isthe number ofperiodsover which group j
isobserved. Thestructure oftheresiduals implies that Ilis blockdiagonal. Blocks on the
main diagonal represent the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals of each group. 21
Thesematrices arediagonal for the level specification. They include nonzero entries along
the main diagonal and and the two kth bands around the main diagonal for the k-year
difference specification.
Our estimator for the Q matrix accommodates heteroscedasticity of unknown form.
The estimator for the variance-covariance matrix is obtained by substituting Z'QZwith
Po+.P1,where
N1T, =W Er>:Zi,rZr4r, and
5=1 7
P1=
rjr[zj,tz,...kuj,tujt_k + Zj,t_kZj,gUj,1Uj,t_k]. j1t=k
2'is the number of periods over which group j is observed, Nisthe number of groups,
and Jr equals the differencing interval. P1=0 for the level specification.
The main problem with this formula is that it does not guarantee that the estimated
z'czz is positive definite. We divide the second sum in the expression for P1byT rather
than by Tj — Jr to alleviate this problem. This sort of problem commonly arises in the es-
timation of variance-covariance matrices that allow for autocorrelation. Following Fuller's
(1985) suggestion, we downweight the component P1ofthe variance-covariance matrix.
Our procedure is asymptotically equivalent to the uncorrected one (as 7', increases).
21fiis block diagonal under the assumption that the residuals are contemporaneously
uncorrelated across groups. This assumption holds under the null, if shocks to preferences
are uncorrelated across groups.
43first yearsuch that Xit =1.The term reflectsthe growth in aggregate consumption
betweenand t+ 1. ItsatisfiesI99o =1and
=
=Wo1t+1 [o — xit)+ xe(l —x,t+iDCI,g+i+ XitXi,t+Ig+I (b )"c].
In words, isa scaling factor on the consumption of continuing groups chosen to equate
actual and optimal per capita cosumption. This procedure effectively uses each group's
initial relative consumption to set the Pareto weights in the planner's problem.
Next, define the welfare level achieved under the optimal allocation,
Vt(C) =U(C,1).
We can now calculate the consumption variation required to compensate households for the
failure to insulate the consumption distribution from a/l sources of group-level consumption
risks as the value of A° that satisfies
U(C,A°)=V(C).
Likewise, we can calculate the consumption variation required to compensate households
for the failure to insure against relative wage variation among groups as the value of Aw
that satisfies
U(C,A'4') =V(C).
Here, (50 —1)denotes the uniform (across groups, dates and states) percentage increase
in actual consumption that would be required to bring average welfare to the same level
achieved by the optimal allocation. Similarly, (AW —1)denotes the uniform percentage
increase in consumption required to compensate households for the failure to insulate the
consumption distribution from relative wage movements.
36In carrying out these calculations, we set p =(1.02),and we estimate the multi-
plicative taste shifters from the shape of the average age-consumption profile during the
1980s. If one posits
=
thelia regression of the form
log C11 =i +g + Sj(agS)g + et
delivers the estimated taste shifters=exp[—-yE=1S,(age')g].As anticipated, these
estimated consumption requirement profiles are concave with respect to age.
To randomize over alternative paths, let 6bethe consumption path obtained by
reversing the observed relative movements: 6= C—(C
—C).This path implies the
same aggregate consumption but alters the distribution, so that winners become losers
and vice-versa. Finally, define A° by
O.5[U(C,.A°) + U(O,A°)) =V,
and analogously for Aw. Thus, the compensating consumption variations, Ao —1and
Aw— 1.involve a randomization over two alternative consumption growth paths: the one
that actually occurred during the 1980s, and the "opposite" path.
Figure 5 displays the computed values of A" and Awforvarious coefficients of rel-
ative risk aversion. The figure reveals large welfare losses associated with the failure to
insulate the household consumption distribution from group-specific endowment variation.
As the coefficient of relative risk aversion ranges from -9.5 to -0.5, the consumption varia-
tion required to compensate households from all sources of group-level risk ranges from a
staggering 24.8% to .6%. The consumption variation required to compensate households
for the risk associated with men's pre-tax relative wage movements ranges from 10.8% to
.4%. For a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to two, the compensating consumption
variations equal 2.7% for all shocks and 1.8% for men's relative wage movements only.
37Thus, for relative risk aversion equal to two, a household with an annual consumption
of $40,000 would have to be compensated by more than $1000 (in each period) to achieve
the same level of welfare as implied by full insurance against group-level endowment vari-
ation. This calculation ignores any potential gains associated with pooling consumption
risks within groups. The large welfare losses reported in Figure 5 indicate that there
are.powerful impediments to insurance against publicly observable endowment variation
among cohort-education groups.
IX. Concluding Remarks
We began this paper by observing that the U.S. economy underwent pronounced and
persistent movemersts in the structure of relative wages during the 1980s. We have shown
that relative wage movements among birth cohort-education groups of men drove large
changes in the distribution of household consumption. Among the less educated, real
household consumption fell sharply for most cohorts during the early 1980s, paralleling
their sharp declines in real wages. Among the college educated, and especially for the
younger cohorts, real wages and real household consumption rose throughout the decade.
Our econometric analysis shows that the close alignment between men's relative wage
movements and relative household consumption movements continues to hold after con-
ditioning on women's leisure, household size and composition, and samples restricted to
men with inelastic labor supply.
In our view, the magnitude of the covariance between relative wages and consumption
constitutes a spectacular failure of the consumption insurance hypothesis. This hypothesis
is not even remotely consistent with the evidence developed here. Our calculations suggest
that the observed departures from optimal consumption allocations carry large welfare
costs. In addition, our evidence against the consumption insurance hypothesis involves
publicly observed endowment shocks. Indeed, the sharp decline in relative and real wages
among the less educated has been a major public policy concern in recent years. Hence,
our findings cannot be rationalized as a consequence of unobserved shocks in environments
with infonnationally constrained insurance.
38One potential line of explanation for our results stresses the interaction between pub-
licly observable shocks and private information about individual attributes that relate to
the acquisition of human capital. The costs of and expected returns to education, for
example,arelikely to vary greatly across individuals, If differences in the net returns to
education (or other acquired skills)areprivate information, then the optimal consump-
tio allocation may vary with publicly observable endowment shocks. The link between
consumption and observable endowment shocks arises to call forth further human capital
acquisition by those agents who are best positioned to augment the stock of needed skills.
This line of explanation is in the spirit of existing theories of inforznationally constrained
optimal consumption allocations, although we are not aware of research in this tradition
that models the connection between observable shocks and private information about the
returns to human capital acquisition.
A second potential line of explanation for our results stresses the difficulties of devis-
ing and maintaining institutions that share consumption risks across broad social groups.
While informational problems may underlie these difficulties, they may also reflect the
absence of suitable mechanisms for enforcing risk-sharing agreements that are Pareto im-
proving ex ante, and the infeasibility of articulating complete risk-sharing contracts. The
barriers to devising, articulating and enforcing optimal contracts in private settings sug-
gest that similar problems hamper political and social risk-sharing compacts. The scale of
political, social and even military resources deployed to alter the distribution of consump-
tion also suggests that actual consumption allocations deviate sharply from allocations
constrained only by production technologies and private information.
We hope that future research discriminates between these two lines of explanation
for the impact of publicly observable endowment shocks on the distribution of household
consumption. There seems ample scope for both theoretical and empirical research directed
towards this issue.
The empirical results in this paper largely confirm the view that animates much re-
search on the earnings distribution by labor economists. As we noted in the introduction,
this literature typically takes for granted that measured changes in the structure of in-
come and earnings closely parallel changes in the distribution of household welfare. The
39close alignment between relative wage and consumption movements among birth-education
groups supports this view, but at least two caveats are in order. First, wedevised our
empirical strategy to maximize the connection between relative wage and consumption
movements. In particular, our focus on households with a nonelderly adult male head
omits the groups that are most insulated from changes in the earnings structure. Second,
we adduced only modest evidence that relative wage movements over one- and two-year
intervals affect the consumption distribution. In this regard, our results are consistent with
the view that short-term changes in the earnings distribution, even when they involve large
groups of observationally distinct workers, carry unimportant welfare consequences.
To close, we remark upon one other direction for future research. Many advanced and
middle income economies experienced large relative wage movements among observation-
ally distinct groups of workers during the 1970s and 1980s (Davis, 1992). Several of these
countries offer cross-sectional datapets with information on consumption expenditures and
labor earnings comparable to the information contained in the U.S. Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey and Current Population Survey. These data sets provide the grist for synthetic
panel analyses of relative wage and consumption comovetnents in several countries. Devel-
oping this line of research would provide an empirical basis for quantifying and interpreting
cross-country differences in the extent of consumption insurance. Much existing research
considers cross-country differences in labor market institutions, tax structures and income
maintenance programs with an eye toward their distributional consequences (e.g., Card
and Freeman, 1993), but the focus typically falls on income rather than consumption out-
comes. Given the variety and complexity of private, public, market and extra-market
institutions that play risk-sharing roles, it would be useful to supplement the existing style
of research with more direct evidence on bow endowment shocks affect the consumption
distribution.
40Appendix A: A Model of LeisureTransferability via Market Transactions
Consider a model in which time-saving goods allowforthe transferability of leisure
across households. Represent the underlying preferences over true consumption and leisure
by the strictly concave function U(C, 14. Household jfacesa time constraint
= — H1,C1),
wb€reH denotesthe time endowment, H1 denotes hours of market work activity, and
C'denotesexpenditures ontime-saving goods producedin themarket. The function
—if),C') represents the jth household's technology for transforming nonmarket
time and expenditures on time-saving goods into effective leisure, L.
We adopt the following assumptions regarding the household's technology forpro-
ducing leisure: (i) Effective leisure increases with noninarket time and with expenditures
on time-saving goods. (ii) Nonmarket time and time-saving goods are substitutes in the
production of leisure, so that 912S0. (iii) The rate at which time-saving goods can be
substituted for noninarket time diminishes with greater expenditures on these goods, so
that iso-leisure curves are convex. (iv) g(H —H,C) ￿ H —Hfor all C.
Market goodsCand C are produced from time inputs supplied by I types of workers.
The aggregate production function exhibits 4iTninshingmarginalfactor returns and is
separableacross factor types. Hence, wecanwrite the "wage"functionfor individualj
ingroup i as WJ(H1, 51),whereH' EJEIH1,and dWi/dH <0 for all jandi. The
dependence of the wage function on S captures technological or other disturbances that
drive relative wage movements.
Under these assumptions, the Pareto problem becomes
Ci(5'), Hi(5'), Cl(S')>A1ptlr(St)U[Ci(st)gi(H —
subjectto the aggregate feasibility constraint,
[C(S') + C1(S')j, for all 5', and
C'￿O, foralljandS'.
If households have identical technologies for producing leisure, the first-order condi-
tions for an interior solution to this problem become
H1: p'UL(C1, L)g1(7f —H,G1) =W1(H1,S')pA', (A.1)
C1:p'Ut(C',L1)g2(— H',G') =mA1, (A.2)
41C' Pt Uc(C1 L') =øA', (A.3)
for all jandat all dates and states. In particular, at an interior solution for hours worked
and time-saving goods, each household satisfies the tangency condition,
9i_•/ = W(H,St). (A.4) 92(H—H',G')
It follows from convexity of the iso-leisure curves that the ratio of nonmarket time to
expenditures on time-saving goods moves inversely with the wage.
This analysis delivers three useful insights. First, it is apparent that the technology
for transferring leisure across households induces a nonseparability between measured con-
sumption expenditures, C+G, and measured leisure, H—H, even when the true underlying
preferences are separable.
Second, the optimal allocation entails complete consumption insurance in the sense
that the marginal utility of consumption, Uc, is equated across households. Thus, the
imperfect transferability of leisure across households does not upset the consumption in-
surance property of the optimal allocation.
ThiM, although the optimal allocation retains the consumption insurance property,
relative levels of measured consumption covary positively with relative wages. To see this
point, consider an increase in j's (relative) wage that leaves aggregate production and pg
unchanged. The wage increase raises the (opportunity) cost of producing leisure for j,so
that L declines and UI rises. Both the scale effect associated with the decline in L and
the substitution effect reflected in (A.4) imply a decline in H —H1and, hence, an increase
in j's hours of work. H In addition, a substitution effect (gn ￿ 0) and a price effect (rise
in UI) both increase j's optimal allocation of time-saving goods. Thus, relative levels of
measured consumption expenditures, C + C, covazy positively with relative wages under
the consumption insurance allocation. 20
Condition (Al) is directly analogous to the wage-equals-marginal-revenue-product
condition for a firm with a downward sloping product demand schedule. Leisure corre-
sponds to output, Ut corresponds to the demand schedule, and nonma.rket time corre-
sponds to the factor input subject to a price increase.
20 If C and .1, are utilitycomplements, then the decline in L induces a decline in C under
the optimal allocation. The conclusion in the text presumes that such an effect, if present,
is smaller than the rise in C. Such a high degree of complementarity between C and L
strikes us as implausible. In any case, extreme complementarity between C and L would
create a bias towards acceptance of the consumption insurance hypothesis in our empirical
work. It cannot account for our rejections of the hypothesis.
42Appendix B: Estimatingthe Covariance Matrix
The asymptoticvariance-covariance matrix of/ in equation (12)estimated by instru-
mental variables is given by
AsyV($)=PZZX'Z(Z'Z)'Z'11Z(Z'ZY'Z'XPn, (3d)
whereZis the matrixof instruments, X is the regressor matrix, and fl = EVeI.
Thedimension of fl isE5 Tj,where Tj isthe number ofperiodsover which group j
isobserved. Thestructure oftheresiduals implies that Ilis blockdiagonal. Blocks on the
main diagonal represent the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals of each group. 21
Thesematrices arediagonal for the level specification. They include nonzero entries along
the main diagonal and and the two kth bands around the main diagonal for the k-year
difference specification.
Our estimator for the Q matrix accommodates heteroscedasticity of unknown form.
The estimator for the variance-covariance matrix is obtained by substituting Z'QZwith
Po+.P1,where
N1T, =W Er>:Zi,rZr4r, and
5=1 7
P1=
rjr[zj,tz,...kuj,tujt_k + Zj,t_kZj,gUj,1Uj,t_k]. j1t=k
2'is the number of periods over which group j is observed, Nisthe number of groups,
and Jr equals the differencing interval. P1=0 for the level specification.
The main problem with this formula is that it does not guarantee that the estimated
z'czz is positive definite. We divide the second sum in the expression for P1byT rather
than by Tj — Jr to alleviate this problem. This sort of problem commonly arises in the es-
timation of variance-covariance matrices that allow for autocorrelation. Following Fuller's
(1985) suggestion, we downweight the component P1ofthe variance-covariance matrix.
Our procedure is asymptotically equivalent to the uncorrected one (as 7', increases).
21fiis block diagonal under the assumption that the residuals are contemporaneously
uncorrelated across groups. This assumption holds under the null, if shocks to preferences
are uncorrelated across groups.
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45Table 1
CellCount Summary Statistics for Group-Level CPS and CEX Data
NumberMean Cell
Variable Type Source of Cells Count Minimum Maidmum
Wages. Men CPS 420 902 227 2291.
Wages. \Vomen CPS 420 762 192 2056
\Vages.Husbands CPS 420 695 190 1576
Wages. Wives CPS 420 509 148 1166
Consumpion.All CEX 288 499 137 1071
Consumpion.Married CEX 288 414 117 396
Notes:
1)Groups are defined by crossing five-year birth cohorts with four educational attainment
categories.
(2) Each cell corresponds to one annual observation on a group. The number of cells
equals the total number of annual group-level observations that are admissible under
our sample selection criteria. For CPS data, an admissible cell is one in which all
men are between 23 and 59 years of age.
-CPSsamples of wives are restricted to
women with husbands between 23 and 59 years of age. CEX samples are restricted
ro households with a male head or husband of female head between 23 and 59 years
Ut age. See the text for other selection criteria.
3 The number of admissible cells and the cell count summary statistics for CPS (CEX)
data pertain to the 1975 (1980) to 1990 sample period. The cell count equals the





Real Wage Movements for Men by Birth CohortandEducation Group Deviations
from the 1980 Value for Osa-Education Group and 1945-50 COhort






-0.16 0.03 0.14 0.17
Year 60-65 55-eQ 50-55 35-40 30-35 25-30 20-25
1975 -0.06 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.14
1980. -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.14
1985 -0.18 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.09
1990 -0.29 -0.19 -0.19 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02
Educational Attainment High School
Year 60-85
Five-Year Birth Cohort
55-60 50-55 45-50 40-45 35-40 30-35 25-30 20-25
1975 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.10
1980 -0.12 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.13
1985 -0.21 -0.12 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.06
1990 -0.31 -0.18 -0.13 -0.07 0.02 -0.03
Educational Attainment Some Post-Secondary (13-15 Yean)
Year 60-65
Five-Year Birth Cohort
55-60 50-55 45-50 40-45 35-40 30-35 25-30 20-25
1975 -0.10 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.19
1980 -0.15 000 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.14
1985
.
-017 -0.06 0.08 00Q 0.13 0.12
1990 -0.26 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.12
Educational Attainment = College (16+ Years)
Year 60-85
Five-Year Birth Cohort














The Covariance Between Men's and Women's Wage Growth, 1980 to 1990
ReqresszonsUszng Five-YearChanges in the Mean Log Wage for Cohort-Education Groups
Time Dependent Slope Stand.
IntervalSample VariableRegressorCoeff. Error
1080-85All Men Women.97(.99) .22(.20) .53(31)
1080-35 MarriedHusbands Wives .95(1.16).29(.24) .37(.70)
1030-35 All Women Men .54(.64) .12(.13) .53(.66)
1930-3.5 MarriedWives Husbands.39(.53) .12(.11) .37(66)
tOSS-GO All Men \Vomen 1.11(.93).25(j6) .32(70)
1935-90 MarriedHusbands Wives .13(80) .33(.22) .24(.75)
1935-00All Women Men .47(.52) .11(.14) .52(.60)
1035-90 Married Wives Husbands .31(.62) (.13)(.17).24(.51)
Notes:
(1)Groups are definedbycrossing five-year birth cohorts with four educational attainment
classes.
(2) In the sampleofmarriedpersons. women are assignedto groups based on the charac-
teristics oftheirhusbands.
3)The samples are restricted to groups thatsatisfy therestriction,23￿ age ￿ 59, for
allmembers over the entire five-year interval.
(4) The entries in parentheses correspond to a specification that includescohortfixed
efteccs.Theother entries correspond toa specification that includesaconstantbut
nocohort effects.




Real Household Consumption Movements by Birth Cohort and Education
Households with an Adult Male Head between 23 and 59
Deviations from the 1980 Value for Own-Education Group and 1945-50 Cohort





50-55 45-50 40-45 Year 60-65 55-60 35-40 30-35 25-30
1980 -0.21 0.00 -0.05 0.09 -0.01 -0.14
1981 -0.51 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.22
1990 -0.20 -0.37 -0.18 -0.22 -0.23 -0.17
Educational Attainment = High School
Year
Five-Year Birth Cohort
60-65 55-60 50-55 45-50 40-45 35-40 30-35 25-30
1980 -0.17 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.31 0.20
1985 -0.32 -0.16 -0.06 0.09 0.15 0.06
1990 -0.30 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Educational Attainment = Some Post-Secondary (13-15 Years)
Year
Five-Year Birth Cohort
60-65 55-60 50-55 45-50 40-45 35-40 30-35 25-30
1980 -0.16 0.00 0.13 0.34 0.31 0.25
1985 -0.21 -0.11 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.10
1990 -0.21 -0.07 0.00 0.13 0.20 0.12
Educational Attainment = College (16+ Years)
Year
Five-Year Birth Cohort









Consumption Growth by Educational Attainment of Male Head, 1980 to 1990
Simple Averages of Changes in the Mean of Log(Consumption) fbr Five-Year Cohorts
Time Educational Attainment of Male
Interval <12Years High School Post HS College
980-85 -0.15 -0.06 -0.05 0.07
1985-90 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10
Notes:
(1) The sample is restricted to cohorts for which the male head (or husband of female
head) is between 23 and 59 years of age throughout the indicated time interval.
(2) The consumption measure equals household expenditures on nondurable goods and
services, as defined in the text.
1Table 6.1
Synthetic Panel Regression,. Level, SpeCifiCationt
Householdswith a 23-59 Year Menial Couples Only
Old Male Head
Estimation Household Mans Woman's Woman's Hwbaas Wilds Wife.
Meth&1Controls" Wage Wage Leisure WigeW. Leisure





OLS No 0.616 0.063 — 0.380 0.070 —
(0.094) (0.105) (0.084) (0.098)
IV No 1.760 -1.392 - 7.807 -10.036 -
(0.640) (0.941) (25.534) (35.248)
OLS No 0.712 — -0.654 0.477 — .0.633
(0.077) (0.315) (0.068) (0.295)
IV No 1.068 — -2.162 0.885 — -2.321
(0.111) (0.450) (0.107) (0.433)
OLS Yes 0.476 0.462 -
(0.070) (0.061)
IV Yes 0.824 1.272
(0.245) (0.665)
OLS Yes 0.500 - .0.347 0.488 - -0.330
(0.070) (0.289) (0.061) (0292)
IV Yes 0.898 — -1.343 1.250 — 0.914
(0.245) (0.899) (0.665) (4.346)
• Each regressioncontains288 observations.
The household controls arc log of family size, the number of adult,. the number of children
under three and the nwnber of other children.Table 6.2
SyntheticPanel Rcçmaiona -Annual Diflence Specification
Households with a 23-59 Year MathS Coupla Only
OIdMalc Head
EatunationHousehold Man's Woman's Woman's Husband's Wife's Wife's
Meth Controls" Wage Wage Leisure Wage Wan Leisure
OLS No 0.019 — -0.057
(0.157) (0.124)
IV No 0.463 0.370 -
(0.269) (0.235)
015 No -0.006 0.093 -0.114 0.240
(0.161) (0.135) (0.126) (0.124)
IV No -0.356 1.276 0.807 -0.772
(1.882) (2.714) (1.541) (2-fl)
015 No .0.003 - 0.661 a067 - 0.568
(0.158) (0.567) (0.124) (0.520)
IV No 0.564 — -1.539 0.444 — -1.229
(0.310) (1.400) (0.278) (1.075)
OLS Yes -0.011 -0.063 -
(0.134) (0.118)
IV Yes 0,270 0.571 —
(0.394) (0.271)
015 Yes .0.028 — 0.521 .0.075 — 0.610
(0.134) (0.483) (0.118) (0.490)
IV Ye, 0.257 — .0.575 0.447 — -0,910
(0.394) (1.004) (0.284) (0.160)
•Each regressioncontains192observations.
Thehousehold controls arc logolfamily size, the number of adults, the number of cbildran
under threeand the number ofother children.Table 6.3
Synthetic Panel Regessious -Five-YearDiffcaice Specificaiiai
Households with a 23-59 Year Married Couples Only
Old Male Head
imationHousehold Mans Warned, Woniad, Husbanits Wiks Wife,
MethodConbol," Wage Wage Leisure Wage Wage Leisure
OLS No 0.557 — 0.485 —
(0.115) (0.098)
IV No 0.670 0.572 —
(0.133) (0.117)
OLS No 0.405 0.237 — 0.333 0.235
(0.168) (0.193) (0.150) (0.178)
IV No 0.913 -0.332 1.738 -1.546
(0.698) (0.876) (1.322) (1.685)
013 No 0.663 — -0.316 0.644 — -1.195
(0.130) (0.482) (0.110) (0.421)
IV No 0.916 — -1.635 0.903 — -2.081
(0.180) (0.580) (0.152) . (0.509)
013 Yes 0.380 — - 0.528
(0.116) (0.105)
IV Yes 0.445 — 0.654 —
(0.162) (0.150)
013 Yes 0.426 — -0.624 0.613 — .0.813
(0.116) (0.462) (0.105) (0.448)
IV Yes 0,554 — -1,108 0.765 — -1.102
(0.162) (0.502) (0.150) (0.487)
• Each regession contains 108 observations.
The household cootrob are log of familysin, the numba ofadu1ts the numba of thildrea
under three and the number of other children.Table 6.4
Synthetic Panel Regrniiais -Eight-YenDiffaaice Specification
Households with • 23-59 Year Married Coupla Only
OldMale Head
Estimation Household Man's Woman's Woman's Husbands Wiks Wife's
MethodContiols" Wage Wage Leinre Wage Wage Leisure
01.5 No 0.699 — 0.541
(0.129) (0.144)
IV No 0.701 — — 0.523
(0.133) (0.157)
OLS No 0.686 0.020 0.428 0.173 -
(0.286) (0.404) (0.307) (0.416)
IV No 1.434 -1.139 — 2.409 -2.763 —
(2.426) (3.796) (7.153) (10.560)
OLS No 0.910 — -1.991 0.778 — -2.131
(0.132) (0.625) (0.147) (0.668)
IV No 0.976 — -2.444 0.843 — -2.507
(0.135) (0.668) (0.145) (0.682)




IV Yes 0,897 — 0.690 — —
(0.142) (0.131)
OLS Yes 0.865- -1.385 0.773 - t407
(0.173) (0.648) (0.155) (0.776)
IV Yes 0.866 — -1.283 0.737 — -1.324
(0.142) (0.473) (0.131) (0.564)
•Each regression contains 36observations.
The household conuolsarelog offamily size,thenumberofadults,the numberof children
under three and the number of other children.Table 7
Synthetic Panel Regressions -RestrictedSample Households with a 30-55 Year-Old Male Head
Who Has at Least a High School Education
Levels Speciflcation AnnualDillàenccSpeciflcation••







OLS No 0.778 -0.050 0.035 0.110
— (0.304) (0.147) (0.245) (0.230)
IV No 1.278 -1.049
— 0.978 0.359
— (0.208) (0.643) (0.7784)"' (l.7677)"'•
OLS No 0.859 — -0.978 0.014 — 0.884
(0.104) (0.457) (0.244) (0.891)
IV No 1.310 — -2.880 1.368 — -2.452
(0122) (0.648) (0.621) (1.991)
OLS Yes 0.556 0.336
—
(0.086) (0.200)
IV Yea 1.507 1.056
—
(0.742) (0.576)
OLS Yes 0.577 - -0.206 0.107 - 0.646
(0.742) (0.409) (0.200) (0.736)
IV Yes 2.412 — -6.163 1.308 — -2.724
(0.742) (12.845) (0.713) (2.141)
•Each regression contains 144 obsen'ations. "Eachrepession contains 93 observations. "Thehousehold controls are log of family size, the nwnbu of adults, the number of cbildrci
under three and the number of other cbildren. "Thestandard clots for this specilication are not corrected for hetcoscedasticity or auto
correlation because the estimated variance covariance matrix was not positive deflnite.Table 7 (continued)
Synthetic Pauel Regressions -RestrictedSample Households 4th a 30-55 Year-Old Male Head
Who Has at Least a High School Pihw.ti,.,
Five-YearDifference Specification Eight-Year Difference Specification"
Estimation Household Man's Woman's Woman's Man's Woman's Woman's
MethodControls" Wage Wage Leisure Wage Wage Leisure
01$ No 0457 0.800 — —
(0.149) (0.147)
IV No 0.768 — 0.796 — —
(0.153) (0.139)
01.8 No 0.527 0.050 0.349 1.034 —
(0.184) (0.260) (0.306) (0.629)
IV No 1.279 -1.116 0.150 1.444 —
(0.534) (1.087) (0.602) (1.196)
OLS No 0.722 — .1.107 1.112 — -2.661
(0.179) (0.659) (0.170) (0.992)
IV No 1.269 — -2.683 1.290 — -3.718
(0.241) (1.019) (0.132) (1.519)
OLS Yes 0.495 - 0.666 -
(0.147) (0.265)
IV Yes 0.666 - 0.699 -
(0.143) (0.138)
OLS Yes 0.507 — .0.083 0.908 — -2.746
(0.147) (0.699) (0.265) (1.035)
IV Yes 0.976 — -1.562 0.908 — .2746
(0.143) (0.865) (0.138) (0.564)
•Each regression contains 48 observations.
Each regression concains 18 observations.
The household controls are log of family size, the number of adults, the number of children
under three and the nmnber of other children.Table 8
Fraction of Cross-Cell Consumption Variation Explained by Men'sWages
Length of Differencing Interval




(1) The "actual R21valuereports the fraction of residual consumption variation accounted
for by men's relative wages. Residuals are obtained fromregressions of log consump-
tion (levels or differences) on an age polynomialandyear effects plus group effects for
the level specifications.
(2) For a differencing inteval of length zero, the "upper bound" valuesreport the results
of implementing equations (21) and (22) in the text, evaluating fiatthe IV estimates
reported in Table 6. For differencing intervals greater than zero,upper bound values
are computed in a similar fashion that takes into account the movingaverage structure


















Household Consumption vs. Mans wage— Annual log change resIduals— 1981—1990
groups defined by 4—way education crossed with 5—year birth cohorts
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Plotted values are residuals from regressions on a cubic in age and year effectsFigure 2
Household Consumption vs. Man's Wage— 1900-1990 log change residuals











C-4 I denotes less than HS education
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2. denotes High School
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3 denotes post secondary group Co
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Plotted values are residuals Iron regressions on a Cubic n ageFigure 3
Household Log Consumption vs. Man's Wage— Annual aata from 1980—1990
groups defined by four—way education crossed with 5—year birth cohorts
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plottedvalues are residuals of regressions on a quartic in age
plus year and group fixed effectsFigure ii
Household log Consu.pt.ion vs. Man's log Wage by Education Category — igeo—iggo
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Figure 5
Welfare Losses Implied by Cross—Group Differences ;n Marginal UtilityGrowth
Groups Defined by Four—Way Education Crossedwith 5—Year 6irth Cohorts
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